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This divergent pattern is also observed for more recent periods. Hall and
Jones (1997) found that the ratio of GDP per worker of the richest one-fifth
of countries to that of the poorest one-fifth of countries increased from 26
to 29 between 1960 and 1988. Easterly and Levine (2001) reported that
divergence of per capita income has increased from 1960 to 1992. Their
estimations in Table 1 show that the two higher fifths of countries grew
faster than middle income countries, and these in turn grew faster than the
two lower fifths.
TABLE 1.
RICH COUNTRIES GROW FASTER
Countries classified by income per
person in 1960
Average growth of income per per-
son 1960 -1992
Richest fifth 2,2 %
Second richest fifth 2,6 %
Middle fifth 1,80 %
Second poorest fifth 1,2 %
Poorest fifth 1,4 %
Source: Easterly and Levine (2001).
Hence, the world division among these three “clubs” –rich countries, midd-
le income countries and poor countries- is deepening. A recent World Bank
research report has confirmed this feature. Perry et al. (2006) showed
that the unimodal distribution of per capita real income across countries in
1960 has become a trimodal distribution in 1999. They showed as well that
since 1960 there has been convergence within these “clubs” but divergen-
ce amongst them. It is thus unavoidable to conclude that the income gap
between rich countries and the remainder has been widening over a long
period.
The existence of persisting growth gaps across countries was discovered by
Kaldor. In his classic paper on the patterns of development he wrote: “there
are appreciable differences in the rate of growth of labour productivity and
of total output in different societies” (Kaldor, 1961, 179). This was the
sixth pattern; the first five were as follows:
1. Output per worker shows continuing growth, with “no recorded ten-
dency for a falling rate of growth of productivity”.
2. Capital per worker shows continuing growth.
3. The rate of return on capital is steady.
4. The capital-output ratio is steady over long periods.
5. Labour and capital receive constant shares of total income.
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Kaldor´s patterns of development imply a world economic structure where
convergence is not guaranteed. Historical experience of economic develop-
ment supports this vision; even though a few previously underdeveloped
economies have been able to take off, most underdeveloped economies ha-
ve been unable to follow suit. Given this scenario, gaining an understanding
of the underlying mechanisms of economic divergence is one of the most
challenging tasks facing development analysts.
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
It was also Kaldor who put forward the thesis that cross-country variations
of economic performance were related to industrialization:
Fast rates of growth are almost invariably associated with the fast
rate of growth of the secondary sector, mainly manufacturing, and...
this is an attribute of an intermediate stage of development (Kaldor,
1966, 7).
Following this line of research, Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin (1986)
analyzed the relationship between industrialization and economic growth.
Using data from a selected group of industrial and semi-industrial countries,
and after identifying some unlikely exceptions –poverty traps, persistence
of the Dutch disease phenomenon in the primary sector, and early deve-
lopment on export services, Chenery et al. claimed to have found enough
evidence to support Kaldor´s hypothesis:
Is industrialization necessary to continued growth? Our models of
the transformation suggest that the answer is generally yes. (...) We
conclude that –on both empirical and theoretical grounds– a period
in which the share of manufacturing rises substantially is a virtua-
lly universal feature of the structural transformation (Chenery et al.,
1986, 350).
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny also concurred to this viewpoint:
Virtually every country that experienced rapid growth of productivity
and living standards over the last 200 years has done so by industria-
lizing. Countries that have successfully industrialized –turned to pro-
duction of manufactures taking advantage of scale economies– are
the ones that grew rich, be they 18th-century Britain or 20th-century
Korea and Japan (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989, 1003).
Some twentieth-century experiences of economic development are consis-
tent with this pattern. Newly industrialized countries are among the highest
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growing economies over the period 1965-1990; they are, in order of per-
formance, Singapore (1), Korea (2), Taiwan (5), Hong-Kong (6), China
(7), Indonesia (8), Japan (10), Malaysia (11), Thailand (18), Brazil (19)
and Yugoslavia (20). On the other hand, all the lowest growing economies
in the same period are non-industrialized countries (see Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995, Tables 12.1 and 12.2). Besides, the most recent successful
experiences of economic take offs, China and India, are also related to in-
dustrialization and economic diversification.
Thus, industrialization matters. That is why the advice of Leontief for de-
veloping countries was the following:
Given the country mix of resources and the available technologies,
the essence of the process of development [is] to create an economic
system as similar as possible to the system of the most developed
economies (Leontief, 1963, 164).
Hence, if industrialization is the key to economic development, why do we
observe so very few cases of successful economic take offs? Why cannot
we the underdeveloped countries catch the train of progress? This paper
attempts to provide an answer. According to a certain vision of economic
development, a period of structural transformation is previously required
in order to take advantage of the external effects of industrialization on
productivity, competitiveness and economic growth. During that period,
national institutions and economic agents have to commit themselves to in-
dustrialize (Hirschman, 1958; Amsden, 1989; Landes, 1998). Coordination
problems related to this commitment are perhaps what make it so difficult
to gain access to the exclusive “club” of developed economies (Hirschman,
1958; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). In summary, our main hypothe-
sis is that the causal relationship from industrialization to economic growth
is non-linear: each society should endeavour to achieve some minimum
level of manufacturing technological integration before it can reap the be-
nefits of industrialization in economic growth.
In this structuralist vision, each country is considered as some kind of living
being that ought to transform itself into an adult before being able to survive
and compete successfully in the world markets. The latter analogy is based
on empirical analyses of economic development. Chenery, Robinson and
Syrquin (1986) identified that along the process of industrialization some
structural changes take place –economies grow up. The main features of
this structural transformation are, according to these authors, the following:
changes in final demands, changes in intermediate demands and changes in
international trade. The first structural change is the well-known Engel´s
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law: income elasticity of food demand is lower than 1; thus, the agricultural
sector expands slower than the economy as a whole. The second structural
change is what these authors refer to as input-output deepening:
As countries industrialize, their productive structures become more
“roundabout” in the sense that a higher proportion of output is sold to
other producers rather than to final users. (...), this phenomenon can
be broke down into two parts: first, a shift in output mix toward ma-
nufacturing and other sectors that use more intermediate inputs; and
second, technological changes within a sector that lead to a greater
use of intermediate inputs (Chenery, Robinson and Syrquin, 1986,
57).
The third structural change is related to the evolution of international trade:
comparative advantages change from the primary sector to the manufactu-
ring sector. The following quotation is illustrative:
Through import substitution and the expansion of manufactured ex-
ports, developing countries shift away from the specialization in pri-
mary products that is characteristic of early stages of development.
Underlying this shift are changes in supply conditions –accumulation
of skills and physical capital plus the greater availability of inter-
mediate inputs– as well as economies of scale based on a growing
domestic market for manufactured goods (Chenery, Robinson and
Syrquin, 1986, 63).
Hence, according to the structuralist vision of economic development, it
might be true that only when a country´s structural transformation is suf-
ficiently advanced it might open to world markets, become an exporter of
manufactured goods and enjoy the benefits of industrialization –including
higher growth rates.
Theoretical analyses that are consistent with this vision include growth and
international trade models where learning-by-doing is the growth engine,
such as those of Lucas (1988), Young (1991), Matsuyama (1992) and Or-
tiz (2004, 2008). In these models, and under an open economy regime, a
country´s pattern of specialization is determined by its inherited advanta-
ges. Thus, advantages in high-learning economic activities, typically ma-
nufacturing, drive the economy along a superior path of economic develop-
ment; whilst advantages in low-learning technological activities might lock
the economy up in those activities and lead to sluggish economic growth.
Several reasons can be put forward in order to explain the strong economic
externalities from the manufacturing sector. First, product diversification,
and its important effects on productivity (Romer 1987, 1990), takes place
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typically in the manufacturing sector. Second, the continuous displacement
of the technological frontier in the manufacturing sector allows the sector´s
learning potential to remain high (Lucas, 1988; Young, 1993). Third, the
manufacturing sector is characterized by intensive application of science
and technology to transform intermediate goods and raw materials; moreo-
ver, the sector´s generation of new goods and new technologies induces the
appropriation and diffusion of humanity’s most important productive for-
ce: scientific knowledge (Romer, 1986). Fourth, the productivity of the
manufacturing sector, as producer of intermediate and capital goods, im-
pinges directly on the system’s profitability (Sraffa, 1960) and the rate of
economic growth (Rebelo, 1991). Fifth, the manufacturing sector typically
enjoys internal and external economies that enhance aggregate productivity
(Caballero and Lyons, 1990).
Some words of caution are required at this point. It is convenient to emp-
hasize that there is nothing magical about manufacturing; other econo-
mic activities requiring an intensive use of intelligence and technology –
informatics, communications, biotechnology, scientific research, etc.– may
also become leaders of economic growth (Landes, 1998; Rodrik, 2007).
SOME EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
A Small Panel Data
According to the analysis of structural transformation (Chenery et al., 1986),
economic diversification is directly related to production “roundaboutness”.
It is thus convenient to test the diversification effects on economic growth
by using a measure of interindustrial dependence as a proxy. In order to
do that, a small panel data set containing such a measure is used in this
analysis.
Based on Kubo’s work on cross-country comparisons of interindustrial lin-
kages (Kubo, 1985), Kubo, de Melo, Robinson and Syrquin (1986) cal-
culated comparable indices of aggregate interindustrial linkages using in-
formation from 30 input-output matrices of nine industrialized or semi-
industrialized countries: Colombia, Mexico, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, Israel and Norway. Observations were taken for so-
me years between 1950 and 1975. According to the authors, each country
represented a different stage of structural change. To that extent, the sam-
ple may be thought of as being representative of the experience of economic
development.
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The procedure to calculate the mentioned indices was the following. First,
the authors rearranged each matrix into 14 comparable economic sectors
and calculated the matrix of technical coefficients A = [aij ], where aij is
the technical coefficient measuring the amount (in value terms) of input i
which is consumed in the production process of one unit of good j. Subse-
quently, they calculated the Leontief matrix, L = I − A, where I denotes
the identity matrix of the same order as matrix A. Finally they obtained an
index of overall linkages as follows: (OL) = f ′(L′)−1i, where OL is a
scalar, f is a 14x1 weight vector whose elements add up to 1, i is a 14x1
unit vector, the apostrophe (′) denotes matrix transposition, and the power
-1 denotes matrix inversion.
Let us decompose this expression: (L′)−1i is a 14x1 vector whose elements
measure the degree of backward technological integration of the corres-
ponding sectors, i.e. each element measures the proportion of gross output
which is produced in the economy per unit value of final demand in the co-
rresponding sector. The final expression (OL) is then a weighted average of
these measures, where the weights are taken from the representative struc-
ture of the final demand vector for a semi-industrial country (see Chenery,
Robinson and Syrquin, 1986). These authors also obtain an index of do-
mestic linkages (DL) by excluding imported intermediate inputs from the
input-output matrix; the calculation is completely analogous to the previous
one.
Appendix 1 exhibits the data on measures of interindustrial linkages, ove-
rall linkages (OL) and domestic linkages (DL), for the above panel of
countries. It also includes the equivalent annual growth rates of per capita
GDP during 10 years (G10), the real per capita GDP (RGDP ), the avera-
ge schooling years in the total population over age 25 (EDU ), the average
investment ratio in the next decade (I10), and the equivalent annual growth
rate of population in the next decade (GN10).
Growth Regressions from the Panel Data
Appendix 1 is a small unbalanced panel. Using this information the growth
regressions shown in Table 2 are run. x to heteroscedasticity –this hypothe-
sis cannot be rejected at the 1 percent level– OLS estimates are corrected
using White´s consistent covariance matrix. The dependent variable is the
average annual growth rate of GDP for the next 10 years (G10).
The first set of included independent variables (the basic set from now on),
are the real per capita GDP (RGDP ), the average annual growth rate of
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population in the following decade (GN10), the average investment ratio
in the next decade (I10), and the initial level of educational attainment
(EDU ). These variables are thought to be robustly correlated with econo-
mic growth (Levine and Renelt, 1992). The RGDP coefficient is expected
to be negative because of convergence effects; the EDU coefficient is ex-
pected to be positive because of human capital accumulation; the I10 coef-
ficient is expected to be positive because of capital accumulation; and the
GN10 coefficient is expected to be negative because population growth di-
minishes directly output per capita. The second set of independent variables
contains the measures of interindustrial linkages (OL and DL), the dummy
variable for the 70´s (D70), and the interactive dummies (DL ∗ D70 and
DL∗D70). Because of the oil shocks of the 70´s, these interactive dummies
are added in order to account for the downward jump of growth rates du-
ring this period; it is likely that the 70´s oil shocks diminished the positive
externalities from interindustrial linkages because oil is the most important
intermediate input for the current technology. The third set of independent
variables contains the country dummies; notice that Colombia is taken as
the reference country.
The first regression uses as independent variables the basic set, the overall
linkages measure (OL), the related interactive dummy (OL∗D70), and the
country dummies. These last set of variables is added in order to capture
possible fixed-country effects. However, none of the country dummies is
significant, and neither are they significant as a whole. Because the degrees
of freedom are significantly reduced, this regression does not yield signifi-
cant coefficients. Thus, the country dummies were dropped in order to run
the second regression.
In this second regression, the initial level of per capita GDP (RGDP ), the
overall linkages measure (OL), and the corresponding interactive dummy
(OL ∗D70) are significant at the 1% level and their respective coefficients
exhibit the expected signs: negative for RGDP and OL ∗D70, and positive
for OL. The basic regressors different to RGDP –GN10, I10 and EDU–
are not significant. Moreover, the coefficient associated with the average
investment rate (I10) is estimated as being negative.
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TABLE 2.
GROWTH REGRESSIONS FROM PANEL DATA
Variable/Regression -1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
CONSTANT
-0,14380 0,44619 -4,50778 -4,88106 0,26691 4,51025
(-0,02512) (0,21906) (-1,45470) (-0,78800) (0,09231) (1,95658)
RGDP
-0,00102** -0,00056*** -0,00054*** -0,00059*** -0,00057** -0,00077***
(-2,87267) (-3,17038) (-2,94060) (-3,24556) (-2,81040) (-4,09695)
GN10
-0,98734 -0,56345 -0,65040* -0,57784 -0,45755 -0,60034
(-0,91080) (-1,64022) (-1,98943) (-1,65080) (-1,12595) (-1,48737)
I10
0,05116 -0,04882 0,37445* -0,06080 -0,04883 -0,09559
(0,55827) (-0,79414) (1,89191) (-0,93833) (-0,78782) (-1,54282)
I10-SQ
-0,00797**
(-2,29897)
EDU
-0,10841 0,12286 0,01416 0,17634 0,14251 0,782443***
(-0,15431) (0,41848) (0,05004) (0,58099) (0,43950) (3,24285)
OL
0,11350* 0,10519*** 0,10917*** 0,26410* 0,08314***
(1,91701) (5,44688) (5,15731) (1,77816) (3,43699)
OL*D70
-0,01232 -0,01821*** -0,01976***
(-1,59489) (-4,25776) (-4,63016)
D70
-1,22414*** -1,23085***
(-3,15716) (-3,44334)
OL-SQ
-0,00111
(-1,20040)
DL
0,02734 0,05205**
(0,91989) (2,20207)
DL*D70
-0,01201
(-1,43523)
MEXICO
1,80144*
(1,90385)
TURKEY
0,66749
(0,55614)
YUGOSLAVIA
-2,00966
(-1,56229)
JAPAN
0,759815
(0,33805)
SOUTH KOREA
-0,67507
(-0,41788)
TAIWAN
0,20117
(0,12088)
ISRAEL
2,05202
(0,59033)
NORWAY
1,00252
(0,43667)
R2 adj, 0,72859 0,74007 0,75375 0,72004 0,72010 0,64091
S,E, 1,13750 1,11320 1,08349 1,15529 1,15516 1,30841
Note: sample = 30, t-statistics in parentheses. Significance level: ∗10%, ∗ ∗ 5%,
∗ ∗ ∗1%.
Source: Own estimations.
Because of this odd feature, the third regression is run including as regres-
sor the square of the average investment rate (I10 − SQ). In this regres-
sion, estimated coefficients of all the basic independent variables obtain the
expected signs: RGDP (−), GN10(−), I10(+)andEDU(+). Moreover,
the RGDP coefficient is significant at the 1% level, the GN10 coefficient
is significant at the 10% level, and the I10 coefficient is significant at the
10% level. The coefficient associated with the squared average investment
rate (I10 − SQ) is negative and significant at the 5% level; there is no
easy explanation for this result, but it is clearly deduced that data are not
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consistent with accelerating effects on economic activity derived from in-
vestment.
The coefficients associated with the overall linkages measure (OL) and the
corresponding interactive dummy variable (OL ∗D70) preserve their signs
and levels of statistical significance. This third regression is our preferred;
it yields the regression with the highest adjusted R2, 75, 4%, and the coeffi-
cients of all standard variables get the expected signs. Therefore, according
to the second and third regressions, data are not contrary to the hypothesis
that technological integration impinges positively on economic growth in
semi-industrial and industrialized economies.
The fourth regression was run in order to test the existence of non linear
effects from overall linkages; that is why the regression includes the square
of the measure of overall linkages (OL − SQ). However, the associated
coefficient is not statistically significant for this sample of countries.
The fifth regression was run in order to check which measure of interindus-
trial linkages was best related with economic growth. This exercise yields
that when both measures are included, the overall linkages measure (OL)
is significant whilst the domestic linkages measure (DL) is not. Since the
difference between the measures of overall linkages and domestic linkages
is accounted for by imported intermediate inputs, the previous result sug-
gests that commercial openness might favour economic growth if it leads
to a greater economic diversification (Ortiz, 1994).
Although aggregate interindustrial linkages are better predictors of growth
than domestic linkages, the sixth regression replaces the measure of ove-
rall linkages (OL) and the corresponding 70´s interactive dummy variable
(OL ∗ D70), both of them included in the second regression, by the mea-
sure of domestic linkages (DL) and the corresponding interactive variable
(DL ∗D70). This regression yields that the measure of domestic linkages
has a positive effect on growth, but it is only significant at the 5% level.
Besides, the corresponding interactive dummy variable (DL ∗D70) is not
significant. In this case, however, the measure of educational attainment
(EDU ) is significant at the 1% level. This last result is probably due to
the high correlation of education (EDU ) with the overall linkages measu-
re (OL): the correlation coefficient between these two variables is 78%.
Thus, it seems that EDU behaves in the sixth regression as a proxy for
OL.
Why is education not significant in these regressions? A first explanation
may be that this variable suffers from measurement problems; after all,
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educational attainment (EDU ) is a quantitative index of years of education
and, thus, it does not capture cross-country differences in education qua-
lity. A second possibility is that educational attainment is itself an endoge-
nous variable: it may be determined by the maturity of the whole economic
structure.
This second possibility would imply that structural transformation imposes
some education requirements (Klees, 1989; Levin and Kelley, 1994; Bils
and Klenow, 2000; Easterly, 2001, ch. 4). Data are not inconsistent with
this hypothesis. In Appendix 2A, a regression is run for educational attain-
ment (EDU) against the index of overall linkages (OL) and the set of coun-
try dummies (Colombia is the reference country). The coefficient associa-
ted with overall linkages is estimated positive and statistically significant
at all levels; the coefficients associated with some industrialized country
dummies –Yugoslavia, Japan, Israel and Norway– are estimated positive
and significant. If educational attainment is run against the basic set of
regressors and the overall linkages measure (Appendix 2B), the measure
of overall linkages (OL) and the initial income level per capita (RGDP )
exhibit the highest statistical significance level, in that order. Hence, educa-
tion and economic growth might depend jointly on the measure of overall
linkages.
A Cross-Country Data Set
The above considerations and estimations are based on a small but repre-
sentative sample of nine semi-industrial and industrial countries. Since the
data set is a non-balanced panel, the results might be subject to all sorts
of potential problems of endogeneity. Instead of attempting to solve them,
this research project focused on the analysis of a larger cross-country da-
ta set of fifty two (52) countries (Appendix 3). Since the project aims at
estimating the impact of industrialization on economic growth, three indus-
trialization indices were built: the 1980 share of the manufacturing sector
in GDP (IND), the 1980 input-output coefficient for the whole economy
(IO), and the 1980 input-output coefficient for the manufacturing sector
(IOMAN ). The data for these indices were collected from the United
Nations´ National Accounts Statistics. The year 1980 was chosen mainly
because information for many less developed countries and even for deve-
loped countries is not available for previous years; thus, a previous year
analysis would reduce both the sample size and the representativeness of
less developed economies.
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It would have been useful to have a direct measure of interindustrial lin-
kages as in the panel data set. Since this information is not available, the
project took advantage of the patterns of structural transformation that we-
re examined before to postulate that the tightness of interindustrial linkages
(and the degree of economic diversification) must be correlated with the
manufacturing GDP share and the input-output coefficients for the who-
le economy and the manufacturing sector (IND, IO and IOMAN ). Even
though cross-country differences of product composition and relative prices
may affect these coefficients (As Table 3 shows, some of these coefficients
are too high for the corresponding level of development), the research pro-
ject used them because there was no alternative. On the other hand, an
ordering of these coefficients shows that in general highly developed eco-
nomies tend to exhibit higher industrialization indices.
Taking into account the shift from panel data to cross-country analysis, the
methodological approach is quite similar. The dependent variable is the
average growth rate of per capita GDP between 1980 and 2000; in order
to estimate this variable a semi-logarithmic regression of per capita GDP
against time is run for each country over the period 1980-2000. The source
of GDP data is the Penn-World Table (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006).
A basic set of independent variables is defined: the per capita real gross
domestic product in 1980 (RGDP ), the average rate of population over the
period (GPOP ), the average investment rate over the period (I), and the
initial educational attainment (EDU ). A second set of variables include the
three industrialization measures and the dummy variable for oil exporting
countries.
The educational attainment variable was taken from Barro and Lee’s (1993)
statistical data base. As education data for Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ni-
geria and Oman are not available for 1980, they were estimated taking ad-
vantage of the high correlation coefficient across countries between the log
of educational attainment and life expectancy at birth, 89%.
Cross-Country Growth Regressions
Appendix 3 is a cross-country data base. It contains information for 52
countries of different levels of development. Using this information the
growth regressions shown in Table 3 are run. As in the panel data exerci-
ses, the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity cannot be rejected at the 1 percent
level. Hence, OLS estimates are corrected using White´s consistent cova-
riance matrix.
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The first regresssion includes as independent variables the basic set. All the
estimated coefficients yield the expected signs, and all of them, with the ex-
ception of the log of education, are significant at the 5% level. The second
and third regressions add the manufacturing share (IND) as independent
variable in a linear and a quadratic way, respectively; however, the asso-
ciated coefficients are not significant. The fourth and fifth regressions use
instead the aggregate input-output coefficient (IO) as independent variable;
but the associated coefficients in these regressions are not significant eit-
her. The sixth and seventh regressions use the manufacturing input-output
coefficient (IOMAN) as independent variable; in this case, the quadratic
expression in IOMAN –seventh regression– does yield estimated coeffi-
cients which are significant at the 1% level.
Taking into account that educational attainment is estimated for four coun-
tries, they are excluded from the sample and the eighth regression is run for
just 48 observations; this regression yields quite similar coefficients to the
previous one, and the significance levels are practically equal. The ninth
regression includes in the set of regressors the square of the average invest-
ment rate (I−SQ); the estimated coefficient is negative –as in the panel da-
ta exercises- but it is not significant. All not significant variables are drop-
ped in the tenth regression; the result improves greatly: the estimated coeffi-
cients exhibit the expected sign: RGDP (−), GPOP (−), I(+), IOMAN
(−), and IOMAN − SQ(+), and all of them are significant at the 1% le-
vel. The eleventh regression is run in order to test whether the condition of
oil exporter has some effect on economic growth, but the corresponding es-
timated coefficient is not significant. Our preferred estimation is regression
10, for it exhibits the highest significance levels. Regressions 12 and 13 are
run for the 21 higher income countries of the sample excluding oil expor-
ting countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands,
Austria, Germany, France, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, Argentina,
Portugal, Uruguay, Cyprus, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile and Mauritius). The
results confirmed that in this case the relationship between the manufactu-
ring input-output coefficient and economic growth is linear, as in the panel
data exercises.
Since the cross-country regressions 7 to 11 imply that economic growth
is a significant convex function in the manufacturing input-output coeffi-
cient (IOMAN ), the minimum IOMAN value is estimated as follows:
−α/(2β), where α(< 0) is the estimated IOMAN coefficient, and β(> 0)
is the estimated IOMAN2 coefficient. The IOMAN threshold estima-
tions fluctuate slightly around the value 64 (see Table 3). This value points
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out the relative minimum level of industrial economic integration that must
be achieved before enjoying the dynamic benefits of industrialization. This
analysis implies, of course, that changes in IOMAN reflect changes in
manufacturing technological integration; it would be absurd to claim that
higher input-output coefficients due to relaxation of cost minimizing beha-
viour would lead to higher economic growth.
As in the panel data econometric exercises, the cross-country regressions
reveal that educational attainment [log(EDU)] does not seem to be a good
predictor of economic growth once one controls for manufacturing interi-
ndustrial linkages (IOMAN ). However, as shown by the cross-country
regression in Appendix 4, education does seem to depend on some struc-
tural factors, like real GDP (RGDP : positive and significant correlation),
population growth (GPOP : negative and significant correlation), avera-
ge investment rate (I: positive and marginally significant correlation), and
aggregate input-output coefficient (IO: positive and highly significant co-
rrelation). The exercises revealed that the manufacturing input-output coef-
ficient (IOMAN ) is not a better predictor of educational attainment than
the aggregate input-output coefficient (IO). Thus, as in the panel data exer-
cises, aggregate measures of industrialization –the measure of overall lin-
kages (OL) in the panel data, and the aggregate input-output coefficient
(IO) in the cross-country data base– does seem to impinge positively on
educational attainment levels.
SOME CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Regression analyses on a small panel data set and a larger cross-country
data set are the basis for the following comments:
Cross-country econometric analyses for the whole sample of countries which
includes both industrialized and non-industrialized countries do not reject
the hypothesis that there exists a nonlinear –quadratic and convex– rela-
tionship between industrialization and economic growth. If this hypothesis
were true it would imply that countries enjoy the benefits of industrializa-
tion in economic growth after surpassing some threshold of technological
integration in the manufacturing sector.
When the cross-country analyses are restricted to industrialized and semi-
industrial countries, as in the panel data econometric analysis, the relations-
hip between industrialization and growth seems to become linear. In these
cases the econometric exercises capture mainly the dominant positive effect
of industrialization on growth for sufficiently high indices of technological
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integration in the manufacturing sector (in other words, these analyses only
capture the increasing section of the “u” relationship).
The cross-country econometric analyses yield that technological integra-
tion in the manufacturing sector is highly correlated with economic growth,
whilst aggregate technological integration is not. This result might imply
that the manufacturing sector behaves as a leading sector.
The previous features help to explain why rich (industrialized) countries
tend to grow faster in the long-run than poorer countries. Corollary: the
convergent effect related to initial GDP per capita is overcome by divergent
effects related to industrialization.
Economic growth is not significantly correlated with educational attainment
when one controls for technological integration in the manufacturing sector.
Two likely explanations may act together to explain this result: first, mea-
surement error bias due to the exclusion of education quality levels (EDU
is a quantitative measure of education in years); second, educational attain-
ment might not be a determinant of economic growth, instead it might be
determined by the degree of economic development.
The latter hypothesis is not rejected by the available data sets: this paper
finds a strong positive correlation between education and the measures of
overall linkages (OL in the panel data regressions, IO in the cross-country
regressions). If this hypothesis is true, education is revealed as a necessary
but not sufficient condition for economic growth. In whatever scenario,
education cannot be neglected. It provides many more external benefits
than just economic growth; for instance, as seen before, education and life
expectancy at birth are highly correlated.
Further analyses are required in order to test the hypothesis of an indus-
trialization threshold for enhancing long-run economic growth. The com-
plex relationship between education and economic growth should also be
reviewed. If our hypotheses are confirmed, some policy recommendations
would be appropriate. First, government economic policies aimed at increa-
sing economic growth should enhance the process of economic diversifica-
tion and structural transformation. Second, educational policies should go
hand-in-hand with industrialization policies so that human capital supply
matches human capital demand along the path of development.
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APPENDIX 1
UNBALANCED PANEL DATA
NINE COUNTRIES, THIRTY OBSERVATIONS
Country Year
G10 OL DL RGDP EDU I10 GN10
( %) ( %) ( %) (1985 US$) (Year) (%) ( %)
Colombia
1953 0,80 50,0 37,2 1,76 2,34 21,3 3,05
1966 3,20 65,4 52,3 2,126 2,77 17,7 2,55
1970 3,39 69,0 53,9 2,387 2,71 16,6 2,35
Mexico
1950 2,58 54,3 40,5 2,224 1,50 16,4 3,26
1960 3,53 68,9 51,3 2,87 2,41 18,7 3,19
1970 3,55 63,9 52,0 4,061 2,45 21,6 3,13
1975 1,15 69,5 54,2 4,755 3,31 21,4 2,62
Turkey
1963 3,32 52,1 46,4 1,884 2,05 18,9 2,55
1968 3,78 56,7 51,5 2,181 1,99 22,4 2,34
1973 1,62 59,6 52,8 2,612 2,72 23,8 2,21
Yugoslavia
1962 5,71 82,2 67,9 1,815 5,06 37,2 0,89
1966 4,97 79,5 61,9 2,324 4,83 35,4 0,96
1972 3,78 87,3 59,4 3,126 5,28 36,5 0,97
Japan
1955 8,26 89,9 81,3 1,865 5,84 23,3 0,97
1960 9,49 94,5 82,7 2,701 6,71 29,5 1,04
1965 6,62 94,6a 82,4 4,125 7,07 33,5 1,27
1970 3,70 106,3 88,7 6,688 6,80 34,2 1,19
South Korea
1963 7,44 89,9 60,9 1,041 3,23 22,4 2,21
1970 5,82 89,8 58,7 1,722 4,76 29,3 1,69
1973 5,22 92,8 54,6 2,133 5,77 29,6 1,58
Taiwan
1956 4,92 76,5 42,6 852 2,51 13,6 3,06
1961 7,21 85,9 55,0 1,001 3,32 18,4 2,59
1966 7,48 92,9 55,7 1,377 3,80 24,3 2,09
1971 6,90 93,7 55,2 2,099 4,39 28,2 1,92
Israel
1958 4,68 83,7 53,8 3,575 6,99 30,3 3,62
1965 4,73 78,6 50,5 5,28 6,76 28,9 3,03
1972 1,17 101,5 48,1 7,643 7,65 26,1 2,50
Norway
1953 2,71 66,7 40,8 4,709 4,88 32,7 0,88
1961 3,61 77,9 47,8 5,673 5,56 33,2 0,78
1969 4,21 87,2 47,6 7,628 6,55 34,6 0,56
Note: Using Kubo’s estimation (1985), this figure was corrected from Kubo, de Melo, Ro-
binson and Syrquin (1986).
Sources: G10: Equivalent annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita du-
ring the 10 following years (Summers and Heston, 1991). RGDP : Real gross domestic
product per capita in 1985 constant prices (Summers and Heston, 1991). EDU : Educatio-
nal Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993, Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries. HUMANxx:
average schooling years in the total population over age 25). OL: Overall linkages, and
DL: Domestic Linkages (Kubo, Y., J. de Melo, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin, 1986). I10:
Average Investment-to-GDP ratio during 10 years (calculated from Summers and Heston,
1991). GN10: Equivalent annual growth rate of population during 10 years (calculated
from Summers and Heston, 1991).
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APPENDIX 2A
EDUCATION REGRESSION FROM PANEL DATA
Dependent Variable: EDU
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 30
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1,212229 0,787968 -1,538425 0,1396
MEX -0,355881 0,315780 -1,126990 0,2731
TUR -0,021976 0,303870 -0,072320 0,9431
YUG 1,112144*** 0,312100 3,563419 0,0019
JAP 1,832601*** 0,492092 3,724102 0,0013
KOR 0,155462 0,778825 0,199611 0,8438
TAI -0,703573* 0,383256 -1,835778 0,0813
ISR 2,882305*** 0,360283 8,000110 0,0000
NOR 2,075020*** 0,291506 7,118280 0,0000
OL 0,062130*** 0,011542 5,383023 0,0000
R-squared 0,948404 Mean dependent var 4,400333
Adjusted R-squared 0,925185 S.D. dependent var 1,861372
S.E. of regresión 0,509128 Akaike info criterion 1,748968
Sum squared resid. 5,184232 Schwarz criterion 2,216034
Log likelihood -16,23452 F-statistic 40,84705
Durbin-Watson stat. 1,880405 Prob(F-statistic) 0
Note: Using Kubo’s estimation (1985), this figure was corrected from Kubo, de Melo, Ro-
binson and Syrquin (1986).
Sources: G10: Equivalent annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita du-
ring the 10 following years (Summers and Heston, 1991). RGDP : Real gross domestic
product per capita in 1985 constant prices (Summers and Heston, 1991). EDU : Educatio-
nal Attainment (Barro and Lee, 1993, Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries. HUMANxx:
average schooling years in the total population over age 25). OL: Overall linkages, and
DL: Domestic Linkages (Kubo, Y., J. de Melo, S. Robinson, and M. Syrquin, 1986). I10:
Average Investment-to-GDP ratio during 10 years (calculated from Summers and Heston,
1991). GN10: Equivalent annual growth rate of population during 10 years (calculated
from Summers and Heston, 1991).
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APPENDIX 2B
EDUCATION REGRESSION FROM PANEL DATA
Dependent Variable: EDU
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 30
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -5,256147 1,868856 -2,812495 0,0094
RGDP 0,000277*** 7,15E-05 3,879813 0,0007
GN10 0,278613 0,378143 0,736791 0,4681
I10 0,123609** 0,045936 2,690877 0,0125
OL 0,063592*** 0,009977 6,373753 0
R-squared 0,849559 Mean dependent var 4,400333
Adjusted R-squared 0,825489 S.D. dependent var 1,861372
S.E. of regression 0,77758 Akaike info criterion 2,485751
Sum squared resid 15,11577 Schwarz criterion 2,719284
Log likelihood -32,28627 F-statistic 35,29457
Durbin-Watson stat 1,238821 Prob(F-statistic) 0
Significance level: ∗10%, ∗ ∗ 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗1%.
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APPENDIX 3
CROSS-COUNTRY DATA BASE (FIFTY TWO COUNTRIES)
COUNTRY G RGDP GPOP I EDU LIFE IND IO IOMAN
Algeria 0.2854 5095,49 2,54738 15,57952 1,55 59,28 11,27436 36,12268 60,65188
Argentina 0.9317 10920,88 1,40455 14,65048 6,62 69,59 25,27867 41,59721 58,39808
Austria 2.0947 17907,14 0,35026 23,54857 8,42 72,65 29,2156 48,45707 62,95066
Bangladesh 1.7157 1347,85 1,98161 8,88429 1,68 48,47 9,800526 31,3015 69,11469
Benin 0.3265 1130,22 3,16948 8,6719 0,65 48,44 5,379944 30,58882 68,37335
Bolivia 0.1211 3069,9 2,04218 9,10476 4 52,24 14,16872 36,43516 64,71951
Botswana 4.9589 2768,72 2,76544 17,39524 2,29 58,09 6,118571 42,54439 72,81411
Burkina Faso 0.6756 751,63 0,02867 10,50333 0,78(a) 44,01 11,86 34,72 64,13
Burundi -0.9321 893,95 1,62694 4,62333 1,23 46,71 12,85013 30,4 60,9
Cape Verde 3.9175 1929,96 0,01533 15,4019 3,00(a) 61 4,8 33,33 58,73
Cameroon -1.7457 2370,16 2,66124 4,96571 1,73 49,96 10,07828 39,32529 67,81481
Canada 1.5902 18634,75 1,12917 23,21381 10,23 74,72 19,47591 60,29626 67,80181
Chile 3.9019 6675,13 1,57158 17,95762 5,96 69,3 21,51048 44,99377 63,51016
Colombia 1.5147 4828,63 2,02383 12,38333 3,94 65,91 23,2868 41,26383 64,25256
Costa Rica 1.3400 6990,17 2,422151 8,86619 4,7 72,7 18,59875 54,8545 68,3
Cyprus 4.6919 8422,27 1,08616 18,15381 6,53 74,6 18,22155 45,02928 67,03731
Denmark 1.9130 18970,29 0,20725 20,28762 9,16 74,29 19,73832 47,74991 67,52627
Ecuador -0.5581 5024,58 2,47682 18,95619 5,4 63,26 17,84806 45,43264 64,78324
El Salvador 1.3816 3985,98 1,47727 7,37952 3,3 57,1 15,01626 33,29592 60,58287
Fiji 0.6922 4549,24 1,3671 12,60762 6,01 68,25 11,58798 46,34994 74,70726
Finland 1.2136 15898,38 0,39975 26,26762 8,33 73,19 27,35022 52,63348 69,25085
France 1.7093 17437,78 0,47854 22,20857 6,77 74,25 25,47335 45,98747 64,43179
Gambia -0.4885 876,86 3,62624 10,30048 0,63 40,18 6,606752 31,21658 72,35856
Germany 1.9897 17613,58 0,25286 23,48286 8,41 72,63 33,63514 63,5 64,5
Ghana 0.7509 1141,61 2,89911 5,47238 2,35 53,21 7,7619 26,31165 53,09951
Iceland 1.2113 18727,74 1,05183 22,28857 7,11 76,63 18,09704 49,49224 69,10832
Jamaica 1.4441 3705,79 0,87435 14,11381 3,6 70,75 16,1111 55,11065 73,15779
Japan 2.4986 15520,33 0,42053 31,05476 8,23 76,01 28,19996 51,9 70,4
Jordan -1.4501 4458,36 4,27767 16,98095 2,93 64,41 11,86719 38,42105 59,34685
South Korea 6.8941 4496,54 1,02823 35,46429 6,81 66,84 29,59015 56,66561 76,44427
Kuwait 1.1728 30059,83 1,84278 14,53095 4,29 70,78 5,559896 24,86793 74,91187
Mauritius 4.7187 6246,1 1,01489 10,68381 4,5 65,98 19,85702 47,50226 67,83147
Mexico 0.2711 7271,13 1,94802 17,23476 4,01 66,76 21,93448 36,41993 58,55291
Netherlands 2.0557 18169,31 0,58401 21,66429 7,99 75,72 18,91155 48,61876 72,6519
New Zealand 1.1025 15443,76 1,02635 20,27333 11,43 73,2 21,69477 53,64555 64,5888
Nigeria 0.4594 1002,73 0,02917 5,79095 0,90(a) 45,86 1,86 29,82 57,7
Norway 2.7469 19615,39 0,48661 25,15524 8,28 75,74 17,30906 50,6796 75,2964
Oman 2.3104 9559,55 0,03917 10,82429 2,73(a) 59,81 0,75 26,4 59,79
Peru -1.0649 4986,19 2,25444 16,40857 5,44 60,38 20,351 48,03725 67,99704
Portugal 3.0998 9979,1 0,2298 20,62333 3,27 71,39 30,02382 52,95856 68,41947
Rwanda -2.3844 1247,21 1,84295 2,98714 1,13 45,77 15,80967 34,67853 64,83141
Sierra Leona -3.7460 1343,22 2,26049 3,28 0,83 35,34 3,540956 28,4 74
Spain 2.5353 12048,61 0,40681 22,00571 5,15 75,53 25,67592 48,3 63,1
Sri Lanka 3.8493 1872,15 1,28592 13,54905 5,18 68,2 18,98982 31,6 43,5
Sudan 0.4488 1062,64 3,09608 9,93238 0,64 48,17 8,076962 33,22901 60,60697
Swaziland 2.3629 5526,65 3,07351 10,01 3,12 51,58 21,65173 55,16831 73,09251
Sweden 1.4093 18192,37 0,33051 20,27143 9,47 75,86 23,02885 48,63635 66,07289
Syrian Arab Rep. 0.0505 1900,05 3,14735 8,32286 2,86 61,56 3,559587 38,33954 80,50306
United Arab Emir. -1.2890 47628,18 4,40554 20,45952 2,88 68,22 9,121071 25,70338 48,63356
Uruguay 2.2168 8620,82 0,66551 12,88619 5,75 70,43 24,11038 42,19928 62,56271
Venezuela -0.5527 8925,36 2,35919 13,70429 4,93 68,34 15,78816 42,7308 68,29229
Zimbabwe -0.4442 3227,86 2,68738 12,42381 2,82 54,89 24,06963 48,75522 63,67754
Sources: G: Equivalent annual growth rate of real gross domestic product per capita over
1980-2000 (calculated from Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). RGDP : 1980 real gross
domestic product per capita in constant prices; taken from the chain GDP series RGDPCH
(Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). GPOP : Average annual growth rate of population
during 10 years; population data are taken from the World Bank World Development In-
dicators 2001. I : Average investment-to-GDP ratio during ten years; investment and GDP
data are in 1996 prices (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2006). EDU : Educational Attain-
ment (Barro and Lee, 1993, Data Set for a Panel of 138 Countries. HUMANxx: average
schooling years in the total population over age 25). LIFE: Life expectancy at birth in
1980 (the World Bank´s Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators).
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IND: manufacturing sector GDP share in 1980, calculated from the United Nations´ Na-
tional Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables. IO: Aggregate input-
output coefficient. IOMAN : Manufacturing sector input-output coefficient. The last two
variables are estimated at constant prices –whenever possible– from the United Nations´
National Accounts Statistics: Main Aggregates and Detailed Tables.
APPENDIX 4
CROSS-COUNTRY EDUCATION REGRESSION
Dependent Variable: EDU
Method: Least Squares
Sample: 52
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors and Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -1,902154 1,103255 -1,724129 0,0913
RGDP 0,000101*** 3,57E-05 2,822693 0,007
GPOP -0,553746*** 0,205551 -2,693962 0,0098
I 0,081329** 0,035959 2,261753 0,0284
IO 0,124880*** 0,029863 4,18181 0,0001
R-squared 0,748446 Mean dependent var 4,614423
Adjusted R-squared 0,727037 S.D. dependent var 2,836534
S.E. of regresión 1,481972 Akaike info criterion 3,715836
Sum squared resid 103,2233 Schwarz criterion 3,903456
Log likelihood -91,61174 F-statistic 34,95958
Durbin-Watson stat 2,020578 Prob(F-statistic) 0
Significance level: ∗10%, ∗ ∗ 5%, ∗ ∗ ∗1%.
